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‘One can hardly call them homophobic’: Denials of antigay prejudice 
within the same-sex marriage debate 
 
Abstract 
The UK’s Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) was framed by the Government as an 
equality measure and, as such, those who opposed the legislation were likely to be sensitive 
to possible accusations of prejudice. This paper examines opposition to marriage equality 
within the British press and explores how denials of homophobia were made. Opponents to 
same-sex marriage attended to common sense notions of ‘homophobes’, either by aligning 
their views with categories of persons not typically considered homophobic or by distancing 
their views from a homophobic other. Opponents also offered a counter accusation that it 
was liberal supporters of same-sex marriage who were intolerant. Parallels are drawn with 
discursive literature on racist discourse and it appears that despite social scientists’ attempts 
to expand the concept of antigay prejudice, homophobia is commonly referred to in terms of 
irrational bigoted individuals.     
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Introduction 
The term ‘homophobia’ is generally credited to the psychologist George Weinbergi and was 
popularized through the publication of his book Society and the Healthy Homosexual 
(Weinberg, 1972). In the book Weinberg offered an alternative to the then-prevailing view, 
by suggesting that it was those who were prejudiced against homosexuals that had the 
psychological problem rather than homosexuals themselves. Weinberg aligned homophobia 
with Allport’s (1954) definition of prejudice as an ‘avertive or hostile attitude toward a 
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person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group’ (p, 7). He also 
suggested several factors that led to homophobia including: a religious taboo against 
homosexuality; a secret fear of being homosexual; repressed envy of homosexuals’ perceived 
ease in life; and a threat to societal and family values. Since then homophobia has become the 
most widely used term to describe antigay prejudice. However, despite its ubiquitous usage, 
many social scientists have criticized the concept for suggesting that antigay prejudice is a 
trait of individuals and for ignoring broader social and ideological concerns (e.g. Kitzinger, 
1996). As Speer and Potter (2000) note, one response to these critiques has been to develop 
alternative concepts such as ‘heterosexism’ that shifts the focus onto a cultural bias towards 
heterosexuals (Kitzinger, 1996). Others have proposed that what is typically subsumed under 
the category of ‘homophobia’ be broken down and re-conceptualised. For example, Herek 
(2004) suggests three distinct concepts: sexual stigma (the shared knowledge of society’s 
negative regard for non-heterosexuality); heterosexism (the cultural ideology that privileges 
heterosexuality); and sexual prejudice (individuals’ negative attitudes based on sexual 
orientation).    
Yet, despite social scientists’ reappraisal of homophobia as a concept, homophobia as 
a term continues to be widely used both within and outside of academia. Homophobia is not 
just a psychological concept, it has become an everyday concept, used in ordinary discourse. 
As an article in The New York Times Magazine recently noted: 
“Weinberg had intuited that culture wars are waged not just in hearts and minds, but 
also in conversation…As homophobia became less and less accepted in American 
culture, ‘‘homophobic’’ was etched into the English language as the standard 
descriptor for the intolerant. No challenger proposed before or since — not 
‘‘homonegativity,’’ ‘‘heterosexism,’’ ‘‘sexual prejudice’’ or ‘‘heteronormativity’’ — 
has stood a chance of supplanting it.” (Hess, 2016) 
 4 
Not only has the term penetrated American culture and the English language more generally, 
but as the above extract suggests, it has become socially unacceptable to be (seen to be) 
homophobic. As such, people are likely to be sensitive to the possibility of being labelled as 
homophobic when expressing opposition to policies that advance lesbian and gay equality, 
such as policies to legalize same-sex marriage.  
Most research on same-sex marriage has been conducted in North America where the 
issue has long been viewed as a key debate within a ‘culture war’ between right-wing 
conservative traditionalists and liberal progressives (Fingerhut, Riggle and Rostosky, 2011; 
Smith and Windes, 2000). Social psychologists have particularly been interested in 
examining attitudes towards same-sex marriage. Herek (2011) summarizes that 
heterosexuals’ attitudes towards same-sex marriage are predicted by many of the same 
demographic, psychological and social variables that predict their attitude towards lesbian, 
gay and bisexual people more generally. Based on opinion poll data, those who oppose same-
sex marriage in the US are more likely to subscribe to conservative political values (Jones, 
2009) and are less likely to have a gay or lesbian friend, relative or co-worker (Morales, 
2009). Research also suggests that opposition to same-sex marriage is closely associated with 
sexual prejudice against lesbians and gay men (Herek, 2009). Critics might argue that this 
last point is an example of social psychologists simply confirming common sense; one might 
reasonably expect those who hold prejudiced attitudes towards lesbians and gay men to 
oppose same-sex marriage and vice versa. If this association is ‘common sense’, then we 
might expect opponents of same-sex marriage to be particularly sensitive to the possibility of 
their opposition being attributed to prejudice, and to attend to this possibility within their 
arguments. This article examines how opponents of the UK’s Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act (2013), writing in the British press, attended to (potential or actual) accusations of 
homophobia during a public consultation. 
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Discursive/rhetorical psychology and denials of prejudice 
Discursive psychologists have sought to move away from viewing prejudice as the 
underlying attitudes of individuals to examining what such evaluations do in everyday 
discourse. Billig (1987) suggested that rather than internal phenomena, attitudes can be seen 
as stances taken within matters of controversy. When people offer an opinion, they are 
positioning themselves on some issue of debate. As such, evaluations are typically 
rhetorically designed to counter opposing positions or to forestall counter arguments.  
The denial of prejudice has been studied extensively in discourse studies, although 
often in relation to racial prejudice (e.g. Billig, 1988; Condor, 2000, 2006; Condor et al., 
2006; Durrheim et al., 2005; Goodman and Johnson, 2013; Van Dijk, 1992; also see a special 
issue of this journal edited by Augoustinos and Every, 2010). Social scientists have identified 
that denials of prejudice are often formulated as disclaimers (‘I’m not prejudiced but...’) 
(Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) as an advanced deflection of a potential accusation of prejudice. 
Billig (1988) argues that this use of prolepsis suggests that there is a cultural norm against 
prejudice. For example, in his analysis of fascist literature, Billig argues that this norm is so 
widely accepted that even far right political parties are at pains to deny they are prejudiced. 
More recently, in their analysis of media interviews with the leader of the British National 
Party (BNP), Goodman and Johnson (2013) observed that while racial prejudice was strongly 
denied, prejudice towards homosexuality appeared to be treated as less problematic. They 
note that when challenged, the BNP leader Nick Griffin did less to distance himself from a 
homophobic remark maintaining that he found the sight of two men kissing ‘really creepy’. 
He did however still present himself as a moderating influence, claiming to have brought his 
party from one which advocated re-criminalization to a position of tolerating homosexuality, 
provided it remain within the private sphere.  
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There is a growing body of discursive research examining ‘heterosexism’ (e.g. Peel, 
2001; Gough, 2002; Kitzinger and Peel, 2005; Speer and Potter, 2000) and how people who 
oppose lesbian and gay equality measures construct their arguments (e.g. Clarke, 2001; Ellis 
and Kitzinger, 2002; Summers, 2007). There is also rhetorical research that examines same-
sex marriage debates. For instance, Smith and Windes (2000) take the US Congressional 
debate over the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (1996), which effectively barred same-sex 
marriage, as a case study of the ‘antagonistic enjoinment’ of pro and antigay rhetoric (p.156). 
Like Billig (1987), Smith and Windes note how the rhetorical appeals of either side of a 
debate are mutually shaped by the arguments of their adversaries. For instance, advocates for 
DOMA appealed to a traditional Christian understanding of both homosexuality and 
marriage, while anti-DOMA legislators framed marriage as a civil rather than a religious 
institution, and access to it as a civil right. There were also instances where both sides of the 
debate appealed to the same common value. For example, both pro and anti-DOMA 
legislators appealed to the idea that government’s power should be limited; opponents 
claimed that DOMA invaded states’ rights to individually legislate on the matter, meanwhile 
its supporters argued that DOMA prevented state legislators from overstepping their authority 
in the form of redefining marriage.  
Other studies have primarily examined opposition arguments against same-sex 
marriage. For example, Matthews and Augoustinos (2012) examined political speeches and 
parliamentary debates on same-sex marriage in Australia. They identified how politicians 
legitimated their opposition as non-discriminatory by claiming the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage was in the best interests of children. They concluded that “discourse 
opposing non-heterosexual marriage in Australia operates under a rhetoric of denial whereby 
any negative sentiments towards non-heterosexual individuals is vehemently denied” (p. 
139). Meanwhile in the UK, Jowett (2014) examined arguments used to oppose same-sex 
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marriage in the British press. He found that opponents of same-sex marriage framed their 
opposition around a number of commonplace values such as upholding tradition, democracy, 
the best interest of children and the need to prioritize parliamentary time (see also Hull, 2001; 
Summers, 2007). Unlike Smith and Windes’ (2000), Jowett found that even opposition 
arguments expressed by religious leaders were not typically framed in relation to their 
disapproval of homosexuality per se. Opponents often argued that they were in favor of 
lesbian and gay equality, but that ‘equality’ had already been achieved in the form of civil 
partnerships for same-sex couples.  
 Much of this work has claimed to reveal how heterosexism is legitimated through 
discourse. However, Speer and Potter (2000) have advocated examining what speakers 
themselves deem to be prejudiced by exploring whether speakers treat their own talk or that 
of others as potentially heterosexist. By examining talk in interactional settings where 
sexuality was made relevant, they concluded that the internal rhetorical design of people’s 
utterances, as well as their response to explicit challenges, display that speakers are sensitive 
to the possibility of being heard as homophobic. Yet there is little literature on how people 
discuss or ‘orient’ to homophobia itself when making arguments that risk being attributed to 
antigay prejudice. Billig (1988) claimed that social psychologists often investigate prejudice 
by narrowly examining people’s views and representations of minority (out)groups rather 
than people’s understanding of ‘prejudice’ itself.  The current study then will examine how 
opponents of same-sex marriage attended to potential or actual accusations of homophobia in 
the British press and asks what this can tell us about common sense understandings of antigay 
prejudice.  
 
The context of current study  
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In 2011, the UK Government announced that it was to have a public consultation on the 
introduction of same-sex civil marriage in England and Wales (Government Equalities 
Office, 2012)ii with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act subsequently granted royal assent 
in July 2013. Same-sex couples had been able to gain legal recognition in the UK since 2005 
in the form of ‘civil partnerships’, which was euphemistically referred to as ‘gay marriage’ 
within the media (Jowett and Peel, 2010) and as ‘marriage’ by many same-sex couples 
themselves (Heaphy, Smart and Einarsdottir, 2013). For some however, this fell short of 
‘real’ or ‘full’ marriage (Jowett and Peel, 2010) and represented a rebranding of marriage, 
designed to exclude same-sex couples from the privileged status of marriage (Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson, 2004; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2006). The introduction of same-sex marriage 
was thus the response to a perceived inequality in the law. The framing of same-sex marriage 
as an ‘equality’ issue was clear by the way the Government referred to it as ‘equal civil 
marriage’ within the consultation document (Government Equalities Office, 2012). As 
egalitarianism is a cultural truism (Billig et al., 1988), framing same-sex marriage in this way 
rhetorically placed those who wished to oppose it in an awkward position and made denials 
of prejudice a more salient concern. The following analysis examines how opponents writing 
in the British press attended to and deflected potential accusations of homophobia and the 
image of homophobia such denials implicitly reveal.   
  
Method 
The data corpus consisted of British national newspaper coverage of same-sex marriage 
collected over a nine-month period (October 2011 – June 2012), from the UK Government’s 
announcement of a public consultation to the end of the consultation period. The Nexis UK 
database was used to identify press coverage of same-sex marriage in UK national 
newspapers (including newspapers’ online content) using “marriage” as a search term in 
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combination with “gay” or “same-sex”. This initial search retrieved over 3,000 results. From 
this, results that clearly communicated an opinion on same-sex marriage were then identified 
including editorial and comment pieces (n=105) and published letters to editors (n=103). For 
the current article any material that attended to homophobia/antigay prejudice was selected 
for analysis. The data was analyzed using discourse analysis informed by rhetorical and 
discursive psychology, following stages outlined by Billig (1997). A rhetorical approach is 
part of a wider family of discursive psychological approaches (Potter, 2007; Billig, 2009) that 
focuses on the argumentative aspects of discourse. Billig (1987; 1991) proposed that 
expressing opinions on matters of controversy involves an argumentative dialectic of 
justifying one’s own stance and criticizing counter-positions. This analysis will draw 
particularly on Billig’s (1988) seminal work on the rhetorical aspects of (racial) prejudice as 
well as work by Smith and Windes (2000) on progay/antigay rhetoric. For the analysis that 
follows, extracts were chosen that most clearly illustrate the analytic claims.      
 
Analysis 
 
The denial of homophobia was an important feature of articles expressing opposition to 
same-sex marriage, both in their self justifications and criticisms of others. The analysis will 
examine two rhetorical features that were present within the data: i) attending to the notion of 
the stereotypical homophobe and ii) constructing supporters of same-sex marriage as 
intolerant. 
 
Attending to the notion of the stereotypical homophobe  
One striking feature of the data were the ways in which opponents of same-sex marriage 
rhetorically invoked categories of person to claim either that opposition to same-sex marriage 
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itself was not homophobic or to dissociate their individual opposition from a homophobic 
other. One way this manifested itself was to claim that opposition to same-sex marriage was 
not restricted to a particular type of person but included categories of person not typically 
considered to be ‘homophobic’.  
For example, take the following extract from an article by the former Member of 
Parliament (MP), Ann Widdecombe published in The Express. The article was in response to 
comments by the then Equalities Minister Lynne Featherstone who stated that the Church did 
not own marriage. Widdicome argued that such comments implied that opposition to same-
sex marriage was purely religious: 
 
1. I have no doubt that as gay marriage is debated we shall see bishops deployed 
2. against gay activists but it is simply not true that only the Church is opposed to 
3. redefining marriage. An opinion poll, independently carried out for the Coalition 
4. for Marriage, suggests 86 per cent of the population believes it perfectly possible 
5. to promote gay rights without redefining marriage. So if, as Ms Featherstone 
6. claims, marriage is owned by the people maybe she should start listening to the 
7. people’s voice. I know gays who oppose this measure – as does Christopher 
8. Biggins – and one can hardly call them homophobic. People who never go inside 
9. a church from one year to the next oppose it. Some of those who spoke in favour 
10. of civil partnerships oppose it. Writers on the Left-wing newspapers oppose it. So 
11. as this is the most fundamental change to society in centuries, let David Cameron 
12. ask people what they want. If he insists on pushing ahead then I challenge him to 
13. hold a referendum. The redefinition of marriage is too big an issue for the state to 
14. foist on an unwilling population.  
(Widdecombe, 2012)  
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Several points can be noted. In refuting the notion that only the Church opposes same-sex 
marriage Widdecombe cites an opinion poll. Interestingly, the statistic does not relate to the 
public’s views on same-sex marriage nor is it about the association between religion and 
opposition to marriage equality. Rather, a majority are cited as agreeing that it is ‘possible to 
promote gay rights without redefining marriage’. The implication is not that those who 
oppose same-sex marriage are not necessarily religious but rather that they are not necessarily 
homophobic.  
 Widdecombe then offers a list of types of people who oppose same-sex marriage. The 
relevance of these categories of person is spelled out towards the beginning of the list in lines 
7 – 8 when she states that she knows ‘gays’ who oppose same-sex marriage (including a gay 
celebrityiii) and that ‘one can hardly call them homophobic’. Thus, the list functions to imply 
that opponents include people that common sense would suggest are not homophobic. Others 
mentioned in the list include those who are not religious (lines 8-9), those who supported 
civil partnerships (lines 9-10) and writers for left-wing newspapers (line 10). This works by 
invoking shared cultural knowledge about the types of people who are typically not 
considered to be homophobic. These categories are also implicitly in contrast to those who 
are religious, those who consistently oppose lesbian and gay equality and right-wing 
commentators, all of which could be used to describe Widdecombe herself and are commonly 
associated with homophobia in the social science literature (Herek, 2011). Although the 
extract begins with an explicit claim that it is not only the Church that is opposed to same-sex 
marriage, there is a broader implicit claim that the same-sex marriage opponent is not a 
particular type of person and includes those that one would not accuse of homophobia.  
 The reference to gay people who oppose same-sex marriage is perhaps worthy of 
particular note, as citing gay ‘friends’ who oppose same-sex marriage was a recurring feature. 
For example:  
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My homosexual friends tell me that many of them are opposed to the planned law change, for 
much the same reasons as I am. One told me he thought they were “silly”, “patronising” and 
“just designed to make a political point”. (Heffer, 2012) 
 
Phrases like this arguably inoculate the author against possible accusations of prejudice. Such 
formulations have more commonly been identified in studies of racism whereby fascists refer 
to having black friends or cite people from ethnic minority backgrounds who oppose 
immigration too (e.g. Billig et al., 1988; Goodman and Johnson, 2013). Ventriloquizing the 
opposition views of gay ‘friends’ rhetorically wards off potential accusations of homophobia 
because common sense might lead one to assume that those with feelings of antipathy 
towards homosexuality would not have such friends. Invoking the opinions of gay friends 
thus invites an inference that the authors’ own opposition to same-sex marriage is not 
indicative of an underlying prejudiced disposition. As with the previous extract by 
Widdecombe, there is perhaps also a taken for granted assumption here that gay people 
themselves cannot be considered homophobiciv. Thus if the author of the above extract 
opposes same-sex marriage for ‘the same reasons’ as their gay friends, then these reasons are 
not to be taken to be homophobic reasons.  
So opponents of same-sex marriage were keen to align their position with the views 
of others who ‘one can hardly call homophobic’. The next extract displays similar discursive 
features in some respects but also represents a deviant case. It comes from an article written 
by an Anglican priest (and journalist) shortly after the Church of England’s response to the 
Government consultation was made public. While the author shares the Church’s official 
position against same-sex marriage, he is also keen to dissociate his own (op)position from 
the notion of religious homophobia: 
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1. As a classic Anglican liberal, I’m slightly rattled at finding myself siding with the 
2. traditionalists over gay marriage. I'm uneasy about my position because I suspect that 
3. much of the Church's opposition to same-sex marriage is rooted in homophobia. And 
4. that's queer, in the traditional sense of that word, because the Church itself has a 
5. disproportionate number of clergy who are gay. But, despite my unease at standing in 
6. the ranks that undoubtedly contain some discriminatory gay homophobes (go figure), 
7. I'm supportive nevertheless of the Church of England's opposition to gay marriage, 
8. published in its government consultative paper today. That’s because I’m committed 
9. to equality, not uniformity.  
(Pitcher, 2012). 
 
By categorizing himself as a ‘liberal’ (line 1) in contrast with those in the Church he 
describes as ‘traditionalists’ (line 2), the author positions himself as someone belonging to a 
category (liberals) and as someone with a value system (liberalism) not typically associated 
with prejudice and in contrast with those who are (the ‘traditionalists’). Indeed, the first 
sentence bears some resemblance to a disclaimer, acting as a prolepsis that wards off an 
interpretation that the writer’s forthcoming objection to same-sex marriage is attributable to 
prejudice. The author then explicitly associates ‘traditionalists’ with homophobia by asserting 
that he suspects ‘much of the Church’s opposition to same-sex marriage’ is ‘rooted in 
homophobia’ (line 3). Smith and Windes (2000), who themselves refer to the antigay lobby 
as ‘traditionalists’, note that religious opponents of lesbian and gay equality typically resist 
being categorized as homophobic by instead positioning themselves as ‘people of good faith’. 
Yet here this author does not attempt to distance his religion from homophobia. Rather, the 
author distinguishes between the opposition of ‘traditionalist’ homophobes within the Church 
and his own opposition as a ‘liberal’. He thus locates homophobic prejudice as existing 
within the Church, in accordance with shared common sense knowledge, but outside of 
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himself. This extract also differs from the earlier extract by Ann Widdecombe in another key 
respect. In contrast to the suggestion that gay people cannot be homophobic, this author 
claims that the Church ‘undoubtedly contain[s] some discriminatory gay homophobes (go 
figure)’ (line 6). The parenthesized ‘go figure’ here constructing homophobia as 
quintessentially irrational.  
The final line of the extract is also worthy of note. By stating a commitment to 
‘equality, [but] not uniformity’ the writer further establishes his liberal credentials, presenting 
the self as unprejudiced and egalitarian. By distinguishing between equality and uniformity 
he also draws on an apparent contradiction of liberalism: the egalitarian proscription against 
discrimination on the basis of personal characteristics (such as a person’s sexual identity) and 
the notion that a liberal society should acknowledge diversity and difference (Billig et al, 
1988).  
 
Constructing supporters of same-sex marriage as intolerant 
In addition to warding off accusations of prejudice, opponents also responded by accusing 
same-sex marriage supporters of intolerance. For example, the Equalities Minister, 
Featherstone, was criticized by a number of columnists for raising the issue of homophobia. 
This occurred shortly after the leader of the Catholic Church of Scotland had written an 
article in The Daily Telegraph (O’Brien, 2012) in which he described the case for same-sex 
marriage as ‘a grotesque subversion of a universally accepted human right’. Featherstone was 
reported to have criticized the Cardinal’s use of language, stating: ‘On these issues, we have a 
responsibility in leadership positions to make sure we don’t fan the flames of homophobia’ 
(Grice, 2012). In turn, Featherstone was then herself criticized for referring to ‘homophobia’ 
in the context of the Church leader’s opposition. For example, the following extract comes 
from a comment piece from The Mail Online: 
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1. anyone wishing to make the case against same-sex marriage must do so rationally. 
2. Calling its advocates rude names, or deriding their arguments, would simply 
3. weaken the case [...] This view is plainly not shared by Lynne Featherstone, the 
4. Lib Dem MP who is Equalities Minister. She said the opposition expressed by 
5. prominent Christians to same-sex marriage was “homophobic” […] Such 
6. blinkered intransigence, indeed, I would go so far as to call it bigotry, does not 
7. bode well for the free, pluralistic society that liberals claim to believe in. And it 
8. makes a mockery of their much-vaunted virtue of “tolerance”. [...] The slur 
9. “homophobic” is designed, like “racist”, to shut down any argument in other 
10. words, to censor debate. When a liberal such as Miss Featherstone calls someone 
11. “homophobic”, the implication is that person is prejudiced and holds views that 
12. are beyond the pale. […] Their weapons are abuse, vilification, unreason and 
13. moral blackmail as they attempt to silence, or at least cow, the opposition. This is 
14. a shocking attack on freedom of speech. Just because somebody, priest or 
15. otherwise, finds same-sex marriage irreconcilable either with his conscience or his 
16. sense of reason, does not make him a homophobe. Nor does it make him 
17. medieval. The tone taken by supporters of same-sex marriage, and not just by 
18. Miss Featherstone, against those who disagree with them has been deliberately 
19. intimidating.  
(Heffer, 2012) 
 
There are a number of points worthy of note here. First of all, the journalist begins by 
invoking the necessity of making one’s case ‘rationally’ as opposed to resorting to name-
calling (line 2). Note that this is applied first to opponents of same-sex marriage (line 1), 
presenting these rules of engagement as applying equally to both sides of the debate. But it is 
supporters of same-sex marriage who are accused of transgressing this principle. More 
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specifically, invoking homophobia within public discussion is constructed as name-calling 
and an illegitimate rhetorical tactic (characterized as vilification, moral blackmail and 
intimidation). Supporters of same-sex marriage, characterized here as ‘liberals’, are 
constructed as hypocrites by transgressing their ‘much-vaunted virtue’ of tolerance. The 
author also draws a parallel between accusations of homophobia with accusations of racism, 
claiming both are ‘slurs’ designed to ‘censor debate’. Indeed, discursive scholars examining 
racial discourse have noted that denials of racism often include counter-accusations of 
intolerant liberals and claims that anti-racists seek to suppress freedom of expression (e.g. 
Condor, 2006; Van Dijk, 1992).  
This comment piece could be seen as an example of a genre of polemic against 
liberalism commonly found within the right-wing British press. A very similar article 
published more recently by the same newspaper but by a different columnist, carried the 
headline ‘The real gay marriage bigots are its intolerant supporters’ (Platell, 2014). This 
article claimed that ‘[i]n modern Britain, the chattering-class thought-police have decreed 
their liberal value system is morally superior to the traditional beliefs of millions of ordinary 
Britons’. In addition to accusing same-sex marriage supporters of being ‘intolerant’ ‘liberals’ 
who censor debate, they are also referred to here as the ‘chattering class’, discursively 
positioning them as part of an elite that is out of touch with with ‘ordinary Britons’. Again 
this is a commonly identified feature of racial discourse whereby refugee sympathizers are 
referred to as ‘white liberals’ and part of a political elite that are out of touch with the 
concerns of ordinary citizens (e.g. Lynn and Lea, 2003; Verkuyten, 1998)    
Smith and Windes (2000) observe that both progay and antigay advocates often 
present themselves as battling against a repressive establishment, with opponents of gay 
equality typically accusing a ‘metropolitan elite’ of suppressing the views of an ordinary 
majority of people (Jowett, 2014). Yet the notion of ‘tolerance’ itself is not questioned here 
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but rather is re-affirmed by accusing same-sex marriage advocates of intolerance. There is 
thus an irony within this genre of anti-liberal polemic. As Billig (1991) has previously 
observed in literature by the far-right, attacks on liberalism nevertheless employ the values of 
liberalism within their attack.  
Yet these discursive features are not restricted to columnists writing for right-wing 
audiences. Another example can be examined, this time in the form of a published letter to 
the editor of The Times in response to a comment piece by columnist Hugo Rifkind, titled 
“‘Eeeeuw’ is no argument against gay marriage; Neither is saying 'God doesn't like it'” 
(Rifkind, 2012). In the article Rifkind concluded that there was no logical case against same-
sex marriage and that while opponents may not admit it, ‘literally all’ opposition was based 
on religious objection or disgust at the thought of homosexuality. He did not use the term 
‘homophobia’ but described opposition as the result of ‘unthinking, inherited prejudice’. He 
claimed that disgust is rarely expressed overtly in opposition to gay rights but offered the 
example of a parliamentary debate on the equal age of sexual consent in 1994 during which 
an MP shouted down a speech with a graphic description of anal sex. In response to Rifkind’s 
article, a letter to the editor written by MP David Burrowes and published in The Times read 
as follows:   
    
1. Sir, Hugo Rifkind (Opinion, Mar 9) is uncharacteristically intolerant in his dismissal 
2. of those, such as me, who wish to retain the present definition of marriage. He puts up 
3. the smokescreen of a prejudiced 1994 Commons debate about homosexuality. I hope 
4. when the current debate comes to the floor of the Commons there will be respect both 
5. for homosexual rights which mirror married rights in civil partnerships and for the 
6. importance of the institution of marriage. Mr Rifkind unfortunately gives succour to 
7. those who seek to vilify supporters of "traditional" marriage as homophobic and 
8. ignores the hostile attacks on freedom of expression.  
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(Burrowes, 2012) 
 
There is much that could be said about this extract but for the present purposes I will focus on 
those discursive features identified in the previous extracts that reoccur here. Again, it is the 
proponent of same-sex marriage that is presented as ‘intolerant’ (line 1), rather than those 
who stand accused of being motivated by prejudice. In lines 4-8 the author calls for ‘respect’ 
(line 6) on both sides when the issue is debated within Parliament, projecting an ethic of 
civility, which implicitly constructs accusations of prejudice as uncivil and contrasts himself 
with the image of the uncivilized hate-filled bigot (Smith and Windes, 2000). Calling for 
respect for ‘homosexual rights’ in particular, also functions to establish the writer’s non-
homophobic credentials.   
 A final point of note from this extract is that again accusations of prejudice are 
juxtaposed with the value of freedom of expression. While the counter-accusation of Rifkind 
as intolerant is hedged within a compliment/criticism type formulation (by describing him as 
‘uncharacteristically intolerant’, line 1), he is accused of lending support to ‘those who seek 
to vilify supporters of “traditional” marriage as homophobic’ and for ignoring ‘the hostile 
attacks on freedom of expression’ (lines 6-8). As in the previous example, same-sex marriage 
opponents are positioned as the victims of intolerance while supporters are positioned as 
violating freedom of expression. The theme of victimhood has been noted as a pervasive 
theme of antigay discourse within literature by the Religious Right, echoing claims of 
oppression by the gay community (Smith and Windes, 2000). Using the language of 
liberalism (e.g. ‘tolerance’ and ‘freedom of expression’) allows opponents to project an 
image of moderation, and to claim to be upholding commonly held values. 
 
Discussion 
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In this paper I have explored how opponents of same-sex marriage writing in the British press 
responded to accusations of homophobia. I identified firstly how they attended to common 
sense notions of ‘homophobes’, either by aligning themselves with non-homophobic others 
(e.g. gay people, left-wing writers) or by claiming certain category memberships (e.g. as a 
liberal) and distancing their views from a homophobic other (‘traditionalists’). Secondly, I 
identified how opponents of same-sex marriage claimed that it was same-sex marriage 
supporters that were intolerant. The analysis demonstrates that the norm against prejudice 
extends to antigay prejudice and that opponents of lesbian and gay equality legislation are 
sensitive to the possibility of being labelled homophobic. 
Several parallels were drawn between discursive features identified here and those 
identified by scholars examining racial discourse, demonstrating that denials of prejudice are 
done in much the same away across different contexts. One feature that is perhaps more 
specific to denials of antigay prejudice relates to the association between religion and 
homophobia (Weinberg, 1972). Such an association is often affirmed not only in the form of 
accusations but also implicitly through the way denials are formulated (e.g. by claiming that 
non-religious people oppose same-sex marriage too or by claiming to be a ‘liberal’ 
Christian). It is interesting to note that an association between religion and prejudice played 
an important role in the historical development of prejudice as a concept. As Billig (1988) 
notes, this association arose during the Enlightenment as philosophers adapted what was a 
legal term in their dispute with unreasoning faith (see also Gadamer, 1979). The rationalist 
thinkers claimed that in relying on religious authority, rather than reason, one’s judgment was 
prejudiced; in other words, prejudice was considered to arise when one’s judgment was 
insufficiently rational. Billig et al., (1988) note that while an association with irrationality 
continues in common sense understandings of prejudice, its connection with religion has been 
all but forgotten. Prejudice is now more commonly associated with antipathy towards 
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minority groups. However, with orthodox teaching in many religions continuing to condemn 
homosexuality, the association between religion and homophobic prejudice is strong. 
Accordingly, not only are those who are religious and oppose same-sex marriage particularly 
sensitive to accusations of prejudice, they also typically frame their opposition using non-
religious arguments (Jowett, 2014). 
Denials of homophobia might suggest that in contemporary Britain people do not 
readily express views that explicitly present sexual minorities unfavorably, or at least that 
editors of major newspapers are unwilling to publish such views. Indeed, criticisms of the 
current study may be that these textual data are not off-the-cuff remarks but the ‘finished 
products’ of editorial processes, and that denials of prejudice in the form of single authored 
texts may elide how such denials are a collaborative accomplishment (Condor, 2006). No 
claims are made here that these articles reflect the way that such opposition and denials of 
homophobia get done in face-to-face interaction, however examining discourse published in 
the press is still useful as it provides an indication of how they are performed within 
mainstream public discourse. In addition, although newspaper data may on the face of it 
appear monological, views expressed within the press are often offered as part of a dialogical 
network (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2004) consisting not only of the author’s views but also the 
views of those they are criticizing.  
 Given that making homophobia relevant within a public debate can lead to counter 
accusations of intolerance, one might conclude that it is difficult to openly challenge 
prejudice (Augoustinos and Every, 2007). To do so risks being accused of impinging on 
people’s freedom of expression. One answer to this might be to broaden the public’s 
understanding of prejudice beyond the individualized notion of the ‘homophobe’. On the 
other hand, accusations (real or potential) would likely still loom large within the debate; 
accusations of being a homophobe would simply be replaced by accusations of being 
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complicit with heterosexism. Rebuttals and counter accusations would then be offered. For 
example, opponents of equality laws could still argue that liberals are trying to impose their 
value system on those with ‘traditional’ beliefs. While the coining of the word ‘homophobia’ 
by psychologists may have informed everyday usage, more nuanced definitions of prejudice 
by social scientists are unlikely to silence the arguments, accusations and denials.  
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i As Herek (2004) notes the first published use of ‘homophobia’ in the English language pre-
dated the publication of Society and the Healthy Homosexual (Weinberg, 1972) by several 
years. Both Weinberg and his associates had used the term in several magazine articles.   
ii Same-sex marriage law, unlike the Civil Partnership Act, was devolved meaning that the 
legislation did not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland. The Scottish Government 
subsequently established its own Marriage and Civil Partnership Act (2014) leaving Northern 
Ireland as the only part of the UK yet to legalise same-sex marriage.   
iii Christopher Biggins is a British celebrity who is publicly known to be gay and is in a civil 
partnership. When asked about his views during a television appearance on Loose Women 
Biggins commented that he was religious and that marriage ‘is for heterosexual couples’, a 
clip of which was uploaded to YouTube by the Coalition for Marriage (2012).  
iv This assumption is not one made by Weinberg (1972). He suggested that homophobia was 
not only an attitude held by heterosexuals but also ‘by the majority of homosexuals in 
countries where there is discrimination against homosexuals’ (preface). 
                                                 
